



Vol. 10, no. 1 (Spring 2011)

This issue sponsored by
Children Creating Bridges, Inc.

Fourth Transcultural Thematic Issue

“Transcultural Impacts and Perspectives on the Future”

perspectives from across the globe

Shaping Cultural Identity

Tragedy and Nationhood: The Sepoy “Mutiny” of 1857 and the Terrorist Attack of September 11, 2001

Jeffery P. Heim



Great Britain dominated the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by their use of sea power, entrepreneurship, economic flexibility, and a strong sense of nationhood. Since World War II, the United States has mirrored similar traits in assuming a comparable role. This article uses the experience of imperial Great Britain and the Sepoy “Mutiny”ⁱ of 1857-58 as a model for evaluating current and future U.S. behaviors as a result of September 11, 2001. The objective is to use these traumatic national moments as identifiable reference points for a cursory look at the evolving issues that followed. It is not the intention to suggest that the Sepoy “Mutiny” and 9/11 were the sole catalysts for the ensuing events. It is argued that a wary but determined Britain moved openly forward seeking overseas control to maintain its national interests – whereas the U.S. has become increasingly uncomfortable in the role of the singular superpower, and deludes itself that it can continue its historic vacillation between isolationism and asserting its global will. Where British nationhood and self worth emerged secure after the Mutiny, American nationhood and cultural identity has become increasingly ill defined since 9/11.

National Identity

Feelings of national identification do not come naturally, and countries with easily identified geographic borders possess an advantage when developing national identities. With the creation of political union in 1707, Britons established at least a geographic sense of who they were. From its political inception, America has been protectively situated between two great oceans with its northern neighbor, friendly Canada, a seeming fraternal twin – just less populous. To the south has been Mexico, less developed, culturally different and far less advantaged. To most Americans, Mexico has been distant, unthreatening, and kept at a comfortable arms' length by desert. The U.S. is a principle based, immigrant nation with two non contiguous states; therefore, a geographic definition of an American remains an unclear and constantly evolving concept.

With their advantage on the sea, post-Napoleonic Britain ceded continental dominance to the French. Maintaining superior sea power was what Britain required in order to travel the globe using foreign wealth, resources and markets to provide what Britain alone could never produce. Essential to this end was British control of India with its cotton for British mills and its citizens for markets and labor. Contrarily, the vastness of the U.S. delayed its desire for extensive overseas materials and markets. Historically, the U.S. relied on sea power primarily to protect its shores and secure the safety of its own shipping. Since WWII, U.S. overseas interests have constantly grown, and increasingly centered on petroleum. In 1950 the U.S. imported roughly 17% of its oil and that figure remained fairly constant until the 1973 oil crisis,ⁱⁱ by 2001 that figure had risen to 62%.ⁱⁱⁱ

Civilization on whose terms?

By the early 19th century Britain gained *de facto* control of India, via the state sanctioned economic adventurism of the East India Company; therefore, all seemed in order until the Sepoy “Mutiny” of 1857. The “Mutiny” was a seismic event that shook the foundation of what it meant to be a Briton. How could Indians, to whom Britons believed they had brought the benefits of civilization and Christianity, “turn on” them, with such rage? If it was true, as Britons thought, that they had acted in the best interests of human advancement, then Indian opposition had to be seen as the opposite, a thankless, barbaric, betrayal. The new 1857 British world seemed upended and truly cast in white and black terms that could be controlled only by identifying who the oppositional “others” were. Their answer came quickly. The perpetrators were Sepoys, consequently, the uprising had to be only a mutiny, an isolated, containable event. Further, the presence of ultra conservative, Muslim, *Wahhabi Mujihadin*, and their anger with Evangelical Christian missionaries, meant that this was a clearly known “enemy” of Christendom. After all, thought Britons, pliant, cooperative Hindus could not have been a threat. These views were self serving and false. Thousands of non-military Indians joined in the uprising for a variety of reasons. Primarily, Indians resented Christian religious intrusion as well as the self serving British policies assuring their own economic prosperity and not India’s. What is essential is that Britain had a history of actions that Indians found insulting and demeaning. While *Jihadis* were present and influential in Delhi, the vast majority of rebels were Hindus. Thus, for the Mutiny to be comprehended in London, the British explained the tragedy as an old conflict, limited in scope, and blamed on a clearly identifiable few – Muslims! In support, the British press circulated accounts emphasizing the innocents who were slaughtered (e.g. women and children), making the tragedy more overwhelming in its savagery.^{iv} Such press reporting allowed Britain to be cast as the victim, even though British behavior initiated the outbreak and their response was, at least, equally savage.

The events of September 11, 2001 had a similar impact on the United States. Americans were equally shocked and surprised that such vitriol could be directed towards them. Americans view themselves in terms similar to nineteenth century Britons; caring by nature and generous with foreign aid and disaster relief. Prior to WWII the U.S. was viewed positively in the Middle East, especially for its support of education. Since WWII, U.S. credibility has not fared so well. U.S. support for autocratic governments, arms sales and interventions (both overt and clandestine) have eroded trust,^v and the terms

“Crusader” and “colonialism” have resurfaced in Muslim cultures to describe Western intentions.^{vi} These realities are often ignored by American leadership and its public. Sheldon L. Richman of the Cato Institute expressed this criticism twenty years ago, as he accurately imagined the present plight of the U.S.

to understand the reasons that drive people [some Muslims] to violent political acts...The stubborn and often self-serving notion that the historical record is irrelevant, because political violence is inexcusable, ensures that Americans will be caught in crises in the Middle East and elsewhere for many years to come.^{vii}

Failure to recognize your nation’s history leads to dangerous repetition, and real American understanding of what is transpiring has simply not occurred. The parallel with Britain continued with the U.S. sharing the intensity felt by Britons of 150 years ago, when the deaths of over three thousand Americans, of varied ages and backgrounds, made 9/11 a national personal experience. The U.S. press consistently covered the event with intimate stories of real people who were beloved children, parents or siblings who died never knowing why, or who their killers were.^{viii}

Just as Britons had their heroes; Henry Lawrence, James Neill, and troops of Scottish Highlanders, Americans did too – New York’s police and firefighters, Mayor Rudy Giuliani, and the passengers on United Airlines flight 93 that crashed in Shanksville, PA. Villains were also readily available. Britons demonized the Mughal Emperor (Bahadur Shah), Nana Sahib and *Jihadis*.^{ix} American fury has been directed at Osama bin Laden, Al Qaida, and a later generation of *Jihadis*. Britain’s tragedy was felt deeply at home even though the Mutiny occurred thousands of miles away with no significant Muslim population in the home country. Additionally, British forces suppressed the rebellion in an orgy of brutality and executions that gave an uncomfortable sense of closure at home.^x Bahadur Shah became the focus of British anger and he was tried and convicted of masterminding an international Muslim conspiracy that he knew nothing about.^{xi} Imprisoned in Rangoon, he died in 1862 and immediately placed in an unmarked grave to be forgotten and avoid becoming a martyr. Britons may have questioned why this horror had happened to them but they believed they knew who had done it, and “they” had been dealt with.^{xii}

Unlike Britain, America was attacked on home soil and in New York, the symbol of vibrant American society. American security came into question for the first time in the memory of most citizens, and caution, a very un-American trait, became pervasive. The U.S. has a small but growing Muslim population,^{xiii} who are not generally understood by the greater numbers of its non-Muslim citizens. Thus, for some Americans, ignorance has become the monster in the closet. Bin Laden was and al Qaida remains a shadowy demon lurking somewhere and, not being able to attack the demon, Americans have lashed out at any perceived threat, including each other, especially if the other is an immigrant or a Muslim. Bin Laden’s death may feel good today, and burying him at sea will remove a martyr site for the future, but it is questionable what the long term impact will be. Today, as in the 19th century, monolithic states remain in the world, but modern technology has created a problem Britain never had, the existence of viable “sub-governments.” These organizations, like al Qaida, are capable of masking their real numbers, while committing large deeds. Victims, therefore, are left to their own imaginations to determine the size of the perceived threat. Imaginary enemies are always the worst. Britain did not have to cope with this psychological issue. Thus, while still asking why this tragedy happened, Americans are burdened by not really knowing who or how many are “after them,” yet receiving frequent press reminders of dangerous activity, making closure impossible. It remains to be seen whether the death of bin Laden will provide only a secure moment of revenge or the beginning of a long term national recovery.

At the time of the Mutiny there was a revolution in the spread of news. When the telegraph was used in the Crimea in 1855, the time it took to receive news from Turkey went from two weeks to two days. Thus, two years later, war correspondents were assigned to cover the Indian outbreak.

Consequently, readers got “fresh” and detailed information plus illustrations drawn on the spot.^{xiv} Considering relative scale, this change in the speed of news delivery was not unlike what happened in the U.S. when millions of Americans actually watched the Twin Towers burn and collapse on national television. Americans sought explanations in their media and houses of worship while sharing their mutually felt loss and sense of helplessness. Expressions of patriotism were intense and virtually immediate, engendering national displays of unity and an angry need for collective revenge. Submerged feelings of cultural and religious antipathy surfaced and intensified. Unlike the British response, which defined the enemy in minimalist terms, America could not clearly define its opponent. Hence, President George W. Bush declared a worldwide “War on Terrorism,” creating an amorphous enemy, resulting in an unfocused response. The U.S. attacked Afghanistan, al Qaida’s operative base, in October, 2001 under the patriotic banner of “Operation Enduring Freedom.” Policy makers then shifted U.S. resources to Iraq under the guise of W.M.D.s^{xv} with no one clear how victory would ever be determined in either case. Additionally, the new Department of Homeland Security was formed. The Department works seemingly successfully out of public view but has aided in the creation of national paranoia with a warning system that has no identifiable meaning. The choice of the word Homeland was also somewhat unsettling. The United States has historically been portrayed as a destination for freedom seekers, and Homeland suggests a fearful exclusivity. Immigration and citizenship are being scrutinized to the point that considerable segments of U.S. society are convinced that the current President is both Muslim and not a citizen.^{xvi}

During the two decades after the Mutiny, even with victory declared, the British voting public indecisively shifted between the Disraeli led Conservatives and the Gladstone led Liberals. It must be noted that throughout it all Britons enjoyed the comforting permanence of The Crown in the form of Queen Victoria. Disraeli claimed the Liberals were not committed to the defense of British overseas interests. He promised security through power, patriotism and protection of the Crown. Gladstone, a critic of empire, felt compelled to go against his own liberal principles to ensure his nations’ interests. As Prime Minister, he strengthened British control of India by supporting a series of wars in southern Africa and central Asia in the late 1870s, despite the press images of razed Afghan villages and their destitute inhabitants.^{xvii} What had been informal empire was now the overt New Imperialism. Domestically, debate intensified over the role of the poor in a nation run by a class system that extolled the value of privilege over labor; however the laboring classes were kept at bay by the comforting thought that Britain was the most powerful nation on Earth. The U.S. is similarly divided politically over the use of its military overseas, but not over the need to insure American interests. Like the Disraeli Conservatives, U.S. Republicans have married the flag to Christianity gaining the support of the white American “working man”;^{xviii} whereas, Democrats are typically less well defined. While partisan debate rages over American troops entrenched in Iraq and Afghanistan, Presidents George W. Bush (in his second term) and Barack Obama have followed similar policies using the military to protect American interests much like Disraeli and Gladstone. Bush centered on Iraq and Obama called the war in Afghanistan a war “we have to win.”^{xix} Recalling Victorian Britain, many Americans have rallied around the “bloody shirt,” and railed against Muslims in general. However, the real concerns, although less referred to, have been protecting access to petroleum resources, maintaining the international status quo, and gaining partisan political support at home.

Implications for the U.S.

What then is the possible future of the U.S. based on the model? A comparison of post-Mutiny British economic and social behaviors with our contemporary world offers uncomfortable portents. British and U.S. responses to comparable economic conditions have been similar. This fact should not be a surprise because economic issues are perceived as concrete and predictable. Whether they are or not is another issue. Both countries are capitalist societies where the debate over success or recovery usually has centered on economic class. Much like today, there was a world-wide recession from 1872 – 1896 with small periods of economic gain. Presaging our current economic woes, the era became dependent on the financial sector’s banking, insurance and investments.^{xx} When nations are economically threatened, as Britain was and America is, they become conservatively insular in their thinking, and liberal empathy

becomes secondary. By the mid 19th century, British industrialists had organized and were combating government interference that they described as both “grandmotherly” and aiding unionism.^{xxi} During our current recession, U.S. debate over the growing national debt is classically bipolar. There is no disagreement that current policy is self destructive, yet entrenched ideologies pretend that there is no middle ground with conservatives decrying a “nanny state” and liberals seeking government protection for the weak. The conservative bent of current U.S. thinking continues to single out “easy” targets to blame for the current morass; entitlements, unions, public sector workers and illegal immigrants, with business practices usually peripheral to the discussion.

Accordingly, Free Trade, the platform of mid-Victorian British Liberalism, died and protectionism ensued as Britain stagnated and lost market share to more vibrant economies (e.g. Germany and the U.S.). Under the New Imperialism, national goals were no longer unspoken and protectionism became more than just tariffs with the build-up of stronger militaries, especially navies. Change occurs much more quickly now than it did over one hundred years ago. Today the U.S. military is increasing its global activities, in the name of U.S. interests, and domestic employment tension exists between the public and private sectors against the backdrop of a jobless recovery. There has been national hand wringing over the export of American jobs, while India’s and China’s economies seem to represent vigor and enthusiastic entrepreneurship. U.S. exports are down^{xxii} and opening China for American trade has been a problem because indebtedness gives America little leverage. However, the U.S. is the world leader in arms sales, especially to developing countries,^{xxiii} and arms production provides jobs. Unfortunately, arms sales also augment international instability, and weapons have become increasingly available to almost anyone who wants them. It is disconcerting to know that recession can spike weapons sales upward^{xxiv} because the simultaneous rise of world financial insecurity coupled with increased weapons sales creates the increasing potential for conflict.

The British government model had some control over its national business activities. The British East India Company had existed at the discretion of parliament. Nineteenth century British Imperial business interests coalesced with Britain’s national welfare, as the empire expanded so did opportunity.^{xxv} Thus, colonial business interests intensified their lobbying in European capitals. Culturally, America has no such “official” government relationship with industry; however, it would be naïve to believe that there is no connection between Washington and American business interests. The number of lobbyists in Washington doubled to 34,750 between 2000 and 2005.^{xxvi} Nevertheless, we cannot infer that when business gains government support it insures a client/patron relationship. While overseas American companies act globally for profit, national interest seems to play little role.

Socially, one of the Mutiny’s profound impacts was forcing the British to come face to face with their own savagery during the uprising. The blame was placed on Indian influence and the moral rightness of retribution. Increasingly, imperial Britain struggled with the perceived insidious threat of the colonial “other” seeking revenge.^{xxvii} Similarly, xenophobia is having a profound impact on current American thinking. Witness the national debate over immigration and the recent anti immigration efforts in Arizona and their attempt to require birth certificates from political candidates.^{xxviii} Historical reticence to unabashedly extend power beyond its borders has been greater in the U.S. than Britain, in great part due to America’s global physical isolation and the cultural memory of advice, like Washington’s, “to avoid foreign entanglements.”^{xxix} Sadly, that reticence has turned to fear.

The worlds in which imperial Britain functioned, and in which contemporary America exists, are totally different. British cultural confidence was extremely high. Britain saw its role as the dutiful civilizer of less fortunate peoples requiring British honor and sacrifice. This era was a world of growing confrontational nationalism where the “Yellow Press” became a convenient marriage of conservatives and the press designed to influence the general public, bringing them to righteous anger when it seemed their country or its interests were attacked. Lord Harmsworth, the owner of the *London Daily Mail* once said his readers relished “a good hate.”^{xxx} British power was wielded like a cudgel and the “White Man’s Burden” became more about subjugation and keeping imperial control than its supposed civilizing

principles. The “Gilded Age” became fool’s gold for everyday British citizens, but they were patriotic and loved martial music, and their world seemed in order.

Conversely the British model will not work today for the U.S. While the 21st century world still has a nationalist spirit, there is a growing sense of disorder and regionalism (e.g. the European Union, NAFTA and the Muslim World). Significantly, former colonial territories are asserting their cultural independence from Western domination. This once colonial world is in growing turmoil as outside influences are shed and cultures attempt to redefine themselves in their own terms. Amidst this tension, economic interdependence provides unfamiliar leverage [oil] to once controlled societies and the U.S. is placed at the center of every issue as the world’s only super power. However, unlike Britain, being a superpower does not suit traditional American self perception. Americans have historically portrayed their country as a destination of hope with isolationist tendencies. That vision does not suit traditional imperial behavior. A scalpel is needed far more than a cudgel because arms availability and ease of travel permit the few to threaten the many. Those who advocate a return to old imperial behaviors simply are out of touch. Commentator Charles Krauthammer, while criticizing President Obama’s foreign policy the day after bin Laden’s death, simply does not get that the world has changed and the U.S. must become a different kind of superpower when he says:

Other presidents take anti-Americanism as a given, rather than evidence of American malignancy, believing – as do most Americans – in the rightness of our cause and the nobility of our intentions.^{xxxii}

Benjamin Disraeli could not have said it better – which of course is the point. We cannot see the world through the lens of myopic, righteous, self congratulation for good intentions. Force must be used, but selectively and not as the first option. To do otherwise will fail and will not represent the values Americans claim to hold most dearly.

Being the focal point of world indecision makes the U.S. the most viable target for acts of frustration and anger like 9/11. With the news media now a 24/7 entertainment operation, opportunities for anger will abound. If we consistently resort to force when we are opposed we will exhaust ourselves in a very lonely world. The press is no longer Yellow, but Blue and Red. The electronic media seeks ratings from sound bite customers while creating political niche markets that exploit the cultural myopia of their adoring followers (e.g. MSNBC and FOX). Masquerading as loyalty to national interests, politically polarized Americans try to outshoot each other over which type of nation they want the United States to be.

The Sepoy Mutiny brought a sense of united destiny and renewed vigor in being British because Britons began to openly seek power in a world that seemed controllable. Despite political disagreement, Britons could depend on the stolid presence of the British Crown and Common Law; whereas, the U.S. has been culturally unable to admit that it is an imperial power because it uncomfortably compels the nation to redefine itself. The nature of U.S. nationhood has become the current question. American nationalism has been fragmenting instead of intensifying as in Britain due to over twenty years of eroding trust in the nation’s leadership. As U.S. forces fight overseas, while jobs are lost due to corporate entities seeking profits elsewhere and bureaucratic decisions made at home, maintaining a “national” interest may be increasingly difficult to both define and preserve. In the nineteenth century, Britain was proactive and its nationally Chartered Companies could be limited by the state or redirected for the national interest, today that would be impossible and not necessarily desirable for the U.S. September 11th has created an environment of American reactive indecision and a willingness to forgo personal freedoms for group security. The question has become who is in the group? Further, lacking a royal tradition, Americans have historically embraced their Constitution for its dependable permanence. With constitutional interpretation a large part of the national debate, U.S. cultural identification is not on solid ground. Americans do not have a long term geographic sense of who they are nor do they possess biological kinship. Lacking these, while exhibiting a xenophobic failure to admit that its international role needs to

be redefined, the United States' cultural self image is in a dangerous state of flux because a nation built on principles and ideas cannot survive intact if its citizens no longer agree on what those principles are, or what the idea of America should mean.

Jeffery P. Heim is a Director, CCB Institute for Peace, Justice, and Interfaith Dialog, Children Creating Bridges, Inc., (www.childrencreatingbridges.org) a Pennsylvania-based non-profit organization. A high school teacher for 37 years, he currently speaks to local community groups on Islam and Indian history and teaches adults in Widener University's Osher Lifelong Learning Institute (OLLI) program. He holds a B.S. in Secondary Education and an M.A. in History from The Pennsylvania State University and an M.A. in History from Temple University. He is a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellow (1986), a Fulbright Fellow to India (1989) and a Foreign Policy Research Institute Annenberg Fellow (1993).

POINTS FOR THE CLASSROOM (send comments to forum@futuretakes.org or post on FUTUREtakes blog):

- *History is replete with examples of nations exporting the “benefits” of civilization and Christianity – and more recently, Western prosperity. However, as one might infer from Heim’s article, this “plug-and-play” approach often leads to suboptimal outcomes and at times to disastrous ones. How might developed nations assist developing nations in ways that are compatible with, and sensitive to, local cultures and values?*
- *Do you agree with the possible future of the U.S. based on Heim’s model (for example, increased insularity and protectionism)? Why or why not?*
- *In what ways might a general decline in the role of the nation state impact the viability of Heim’s analysis?*
- *In addition to the factors identified by Heim, what factors might also account for the difference in Britain’s response and the US response to tragedy?*
- *What factors contributed substantially to the rise of Britain and later the US as world powers – and which of these factors might people be taking for granted today as hidden assumptions?*
- *Heim argues that [the terrorist attack of] 9/11 did not create a sense of united destiny for the US. However, it can be argued that World War I and World War II did. Assuming that both analyses are correct, what changed in the interim?*
- *The author observes that Americans are not linked by biological “kinship.” What advantages do “monotribal” nations have? What advantages to “polytribal” nations have? (Also see Rishi & Rishi article, this issue.)*
- *Heim discusses sound bite customers and the “political niche markets that exploit the cultural myopia of their adoring followers (e.g., MSNBC and FOX). Considering several factors – the news entertainment factor, growing disenchantment with “politics as usual,” and the possible shifting balance between holistic and reductionist thinking – what possible future do you envision for “narrowcasting” (feasting exclusively on media and content that align with your own point of view)?*

ⁱ Sepoys were Indians who fought in the East India Company Army. The term is from the Persian *sepahi*; a Hindu policeman. It is recognized that there has been a lengthy debate over the nature of this event. Indians call the uprising the first Indian War of Independence while Britons called it a Mutiny. Mutiny is being used here because this paper is about the contemporary British perspective.

ⁱⁱ Jeffrey P Bialos. "Oil Imports and National Security: The legal and Policy Framework for Ensuring United States Access to Strategic Resources." *University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law*. Vol 11:2 (1990), p. 246.

ⁱⁱⁱ PolitiFact.com. "Kerry Says U.S. Imports More Oil Now Than Before 9/11," June 6, 2010, ABC "This Week."

^{iv} The massacre at Cawnpore (Kanpur) of over 400 Britons including the butchering of over 200 women and children at the *Bibighar* became the rallying cry of the "Army of Retribution." British excesses, such as at *Secundra Bagh*, were portrayed as payment in kind.

^v For example: twice placing the Shah of Iran on the throne in the 1940s and 50s, involvement in conflicts over Israel and two Gulf Wars.

^{vi} President George W. Bush unwisely used the term "crusade" while speaking on Sept. 16, 2001. Peter Ford. "Europe Cringes With Bush 'crusade' Against Terrorists." *Christian Science Monitor*. Sept. 19, 2001. csmonitor.com. It is no coincidence that Libya's President Gaddafi's immediate response to Western air intervention on March 20, 2011 was to call the attacks "a colonialist crusade of aggression. This can lead to open a new crusade war." Such code words ring true in much of the Muslim World and the West would do well to remember it. "Libya: U.S., U.K. and France Attack Gaddafi Forces." March 20, 2011, bbc.co.uk.

^{vii} Sheldon L. Richman. "'Ancient History': U.S. Conduct in the Middle East Since World War II and the Folly of Intervention." August 16, 1991, *Policy Analysis* no. 159. cato.org

^{viii} "Time is passing. Yet, for the United States of America, there will be no forgetting September the 11th. We will remember every rescuer who died in honor. We will remember every family that lives in grief. We will remember the fire and ash, the last phone calls, the funerals of the children." President George W. Bush, November 11, 2001

^{ix} Nana Sahib was falsely blamed for the Cawnpore Massacre. He was the adopted son of the ruler of Oudh [Awadh]. The British denied his right of inheritance through the 1849 Policy of Lapse. British anger was so pervasive that when Nana Sahib was made a character in the 1858 production of the play *Jessie Brown*, the actor playing Nana Sahib finally refused to go on stage because he was constantly pelted by food and refuse. The very successful playwright, Dion Boucicault, wound up playing the role until 1872.

^x Discomfort can be seen from Charles Griffith, a participant at Delhi who said "It was a war of extermination... one of the most cruel and vindictive wars this world has seen..." William Dalrymple. *The Last Mughal*. New York, 2008, p. 336.

^{xi} Few Britons in India actually believed he could be guilty of anything other than being used by everyone. See Dalrymple, *The Last Mughal*, 398 – 410.

^{xii} However, just as the U.S was frustrated by the mystery of bin Laden's whereabouts, the British never learned the fate of Nana Sahib. He was rumored to be around into the 1880s.

^{xiii} It is difficult to determine the actual number of Muslims in the U.S. since there is no non partisan group who collects such data. Estimates range from about 1.8 million to 7 million. I have chosen a middle ground. Grossman, Cathy Lynn. "Number of U.S. Muslims to Double." usatoday.com. January 11, 2011. Daniel Pipes. "How many U.S. Muslims," *New York Post*. Oct. 29, 2001. Currently the number of Muslims is probably 3-4 million, about 1% of the U.S. population.

^{xiv} *The London Illustrated News* began in 1842.

^{xv} Former Sec. of State Condoleezza Rice admitted that the government knew before the invasion of Iraq that Saddam Hussain did not possess W.M.D.s. "Ex-Secretary Apologizes for W.M.D. Scare," Frank Larimore. *NY Times*. July 4, 2009. www.nytimes.com.

^{xvi} "...many Americans harbor lingering animosity toward Muslims. Twenty-eight percent of voters do not believe Muslims should be eligible to sit on the U.S. Supreme Court. Nearly one-third of the country thinks adherents of Islam should be barred from running for President — a slightly higher percentage than the 24% who mistakenly believe the current occupant of the Oval Office is himself a Muslim. In all, just 47% of respondents believe Obama is a Christian; 24% declined to respond to the question or said they were unsure, and 5% believe he is neither Christian nor Muslim." Alex Altman. "Time Poll: Majority Oppose Mosque, Many Distrust Muslims," August 19, 2010. time.com. According to *U.S. News and World Report* only 28% of Republican primary voters believe that President Obama was born in the U.S. which is down from 36% in 2009. Robert Schlesinger. "Poll: Birthers Now Make Up a Majority of Republican Primary Voters." February 16, 2011. usnews.com.

^{xvii} Britain took the Transvaal in 1877 and fought the Zulus in 1879 to secure the Cape sea routes. Afghanistan was invaded to secure it against the Russians.

^{xviii} "...whites with no college degree favored Republican over Democratic candidates by a 62 percent to 35 percent margin." Harold Meyerson. "That White Working Class," *Washington Post*. November 3, 2010. washingtonpost.com.

^{xix} Peter Nicholas and Robin Abcarian. "Obama Stands by His Decision to End War," *Los Angeles Times*. July 16, 2008

^{xx} Lawrence James. *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire*. NY, 1994, 202.

^{xxi} See Andrew H. Yarmie. Employers' "Organizations in Mid-Victorian England," *International Review of Social History*. 1980 (25: 209-235).

^{xxii} U.S. trade deficit in goods and services increased to \$46.3 billion in January, 2011 from \$40.3 billion (revised) in December, 2010, as imports increased more than exports. tradingeconomics.com, March 4, 2011.

^{xxiii} Thom Shanker. "Bad Economy Drives Down American Arms Sales," *New York Times*. September 12, 2010. www.nytimes.com.

^{xxiv} Richard Norton-Taylor. "Global arms sales rose as recession hit." "Top 100 arms companies increased sales by 8% in 2009..." February 20, 2011. guardian.co.uk.

^{xxv} The scramble for Africa continued the policy of granting chartered companies similar to what happened earlier in India.

^{xxvi} Jeffrey H. Birnbaum. "The Road to Riches is Called K Street." *New York Times*. June 22, 2005. www.nytimes.com.

^{xxvii} The Irish were vilified long before the Mutiny and it increased as the century wore on. Anti-Semitism was rising, e.g. the early belief about Jack the Ripper in 1888 was that he was a Jew, because no Englishman could have acted in such a way. Bram Stoker's Dracula appeared in 1897.

^{xxviii} Over a dozen states have introduced anti Sharia laws.

^{xxix} Examples would be the Monroe Doctrine, The Red Scare after WWI, McCarthyism after WWII, The Cuban Missile Crisis and The Nixon Doctrine.

^{xxx} James, *Rise and Fall*, 201-04.

^{xxxi} Charles Krauthammer, "Obama 'leads' from behind," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, May 2, 2011.